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 CHAPTER 4 
 In his  1979 article ‘The Ethics of Abortion’, and in the two chap-
ters ‘Abortion’ and ‘Defences of Abortion’ from his 1984 book,  An 
Introduction to Practical Ethics , Joseph Mahon mounts an argument 
against abortion and criticizes several defences of abortion, including that 
of Judith Jarvis Thomson. 1 In this essay I am concerned with Mahon’s 
argument against abortion, Thomson’s defence of abortion, and Mahon’s 
criticisms of her defence. I reject his argument, and I defend Thomson 
from his criticisms. 2 Although I highlight two problems with her argu-
ment, I conclude by offering remedies for these problems. 
1   PRACTICAL ETHICS AND ‘A DEFENSE OF ABORTION’ 
 Judith Jarvis Thomson’s ‘A Defense of Abortion’ was published in the 
very fi rst issue of the journal  Philosophy & Public Affairs, in 1971. The 
article that immediately followed it was ‘Understanding the Abortion 
Argument’, by Roger Wertheimer ( 1971 ). The third issue of the journal 
contained a response to Thomson by Baruch Brody ( 1972 ), ‘Thomson on 
Abortion’. The fi fth issue of the journal contained the article ‘Abortion 
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and Infanticide’, by Michael Tooley ( 1972 ). The sixth issue of the journal 
contained another response to Thomson by John Finnis ( 1973 ), ‘The 
Rights and Wrongs of Abortion: A Reply to Judith Thomson’, as well as a 
response to Finnis from Thomson ( 1973 ), ‘Rights and Deaths’. 
 It is not an exaggeration to say that the journal put the topic of abor-
tion on the philosophical map and that Thomson’s article did more than 
any other article, before it or since, to energize philosophical debate about 
abortion. 3 As Mahon says in introducing Thomson’s argument, ‘This 
paper has occasioned a large volume of discussion among professional 
philosophers, and is regarded as one of the best things yet written on this 
subject’ ( 1984 , p. 107). When James Rachels published the fi rst edition of 
his important anthology of practical or applied ethics,  Moral Problems , in 
 1975 , he included Thomson’s article. That book went on to sell 100,000 
copies, in over three editions. Thomson’s article remains one of the most 
reprinted philosophy articles of all time (Parent  1986 ). 
 Philosophy & Public Affairs was the offi cial journal of the Society for 
Philosophy and Public Affairs. In his 1975 article ‘Philosophy and Public 
Matters’, Mahon points out that ‘some North Americans engaged pro-
fessionally in philosophy saw the need for a Society for Philosophy and 
Public Affairs (originally the Society for Philosophy and Public Policy), 
founded in May 1969 by Sidney Morgenbesser, Thomas Nagel, and oth-
ers’ (Mahon  1975 , p. 7). Mahon returns to the subject of this society 
and their statement of purpose in ‘The Emergence of Practical Ethics’, 
the fi rst chapter of  An Introduction to Practical Ethics , where he says 
that ‘The third area of ethics, and that which forms the subject area of 
this book, is that which, following the example of the young Australian 
philosopher, Peter Singer, I have called “practical ethics”’, and which ‘is 
a relatively recent phenomenon, and again one that is notably American 
in origin and practice’ (Mahon  1984 , pp.  12–13). The emergence of 
practical ethics in the late 1960s and early 1970s, Mahon says, had three 
causes. First, it was a reaction to the moral philosophy that had preceded 
it, which was dominated by metaethics and which was ‘highly theoreti-
cal and abstract, rarely if ever concerning itself with real social and moral 
issues’ (Mahon  1984 , p.  16). Second, it was a reaction to the USA’s 
involvement in the Vietnam War, which led to people questioning other 
‘issues of a practical and moral nature’. And, fi nally, it ‘was a response, 
and the only decent response, to a widespread call for “involvement”’ in 
the 1960s (Mahon  1984 , p. 17). 
 What Mahon says here is correct and is repeated by Thomson ( 2013 ) 
herself in her autobiographical account of that time, ‘How It Was’. But 
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there is more to the story of the emergence of the topic of abortion, in 
particular, at this time. The original ‘mission statement’ of the Society for 
Philosophy and Public Affairs did not even mention the topic of abortion:
 The subject is not political philosophy or ethics in the abstract but rather 
concrete contemporary problems like conscription, police power, methods 
and occasions of warfare, treatment of individuals charged with crimes, 
population control, compensation for social disadvantages, eugenics, and so 
forth (quoted in Thomson  2013 , pp. 49–50). 
 While Mahon is right in saying, in the chapter ‘Abortion’, that ‘when 
philosophy, and especially ethics, became “practical” in the late 60s, one 
of the fi rst issues to be scrutinized was abortion’ (Mahon  1984 , p. 88), it 
is at least arguable that this was in part due to the then current debate in 
the USA over the legalization of abortion. The case of  Roe v. Wade fi rst 
reached the US Supreme Court in 1970, although it was not decided 
until 1973, after the court had met a second time. At the time of her writ-
ing, in 1971, abortion was still prohibited in most states in the USA. As 
Thomson says:
 in most states in this country women are compelled by law to be not merely 
Minimally Decent Samaritans, but Good Samaritans to unborn persons 
inside them … it does show that there is a gross injustice in the existing state 
of the law (Thomson  1971 , p. 63). 
 When Ronald Dworkin anthologized Thomson’s article in his collection, 
 The Philosophy of Law , it was introduced as one of the essays that discussed 
‘issues of political philosophy that the United States Supreme Court has 
recently had to consider’ (Dworkin  1977 , p. 13). Thomson’s own gloss 
on this is as follows
 Philosophers interested in ethics began publishing papers on topics that the 
standard philosophy journals had never published papers on before  – we 
wrote on topics such as abortion, just war, the right to privacy, self-defense, 
and affi rmative action and preferential hiring and the rights of women and 
minorities more generally. It was remarkable! Much of that material was fi rst 
published in  Philosophy and Public Affairs , which was founded by Marshall 
Cohen in 1971: it invited lawyers and political theorists to join moral phi-
losophers in dealing with concrete moral issues and was an immediate suc-
cess (Thomson  2013 , p. 55). 
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 Thomson’s article was not merely groundbreaking because it addressed, 
with great philosophical sophistication, the topic of abortion—a topic 
that, more than 40 years later, continues to overshadow many important 
US Supreme Court cases. 4 It was also groundbreaking in terms of what 
it did for women. As N. Ann Davis has pointed out, the article was more 
instrumental than even John Rawls’s  A Theory of Justice , also published in 
 1971 , in drawing more women into the growing philosophy and public 
affairs movement:
 The philosophy and public affairs movement did not begin with the publica-
tion of ADA [‘A Defense of Abortion’]. It already had roots, sources, and 
sustainers. But the publication of ADA helped expand its base. The reception 
of Thomson’s article was no doubt affected by the recent publication of John 
Rawls’s  A Theory of Justice , which gave philosophers with interests in social 
and moral issues both the incentive to undertake serious work in moral and 
political theory, and an inspiring model of how work in that portion of philos-
ophy could be both theoretically powerful and normatively rich. Nevertheless, 
it was the publication of ADA that provided the true catalyst in many cases: 
the spark that fused students’ passionate interest in philosophy with the belief 
that the discipline might have a place for them, and the conviction that they 
might have something important to contribute to it. This was especially true, 
I think, for students of philosophy who were women. Thomson’s work helped 
sustain both their self-esteem and their commitment through even the most 
diffi cult phases of graduate study (Davis  2001 , pp. 85–86). 
 As Davis adds in a footnote: ‘Within two weeks of the article’s arrival in 
the library, every one of the female graduate students in philosophy had 
read it’ (Davis  2001 , p. 95, n. 5). 
 Thomson’s article did more than draw women into the growing phi-
losophy and public affairs movement. As Davis ( 2001 , p. 85) says, ‘Its 
style, too, was revolutionary’. It was not merely that Thomson argued for 
conclusions on the basis of moral intuitions about striking examples. All 
of these examples were also presented to readers in the form of a second- 
personal address:
 By casting her central example – the notorious, unconscious violinist – in 
the second person, Thomson showed philosophers that there was a viable 
alternative to the disengaged stance of the philosophical analyst, one that 
helped strengthen individual philosophers’ convictions that they could  – 
and should  – be involved in social issues as committed participants, not 
merely as neutral observers or analysts (Davis  2001 , p. 85). 
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 Indeed, Thomson is responsible for what is surely one of the most famous 
sentences in all of moral philosophy: ‘You wake up in the morning and 
fi nd yourself back to back in bed with an unconscious violinist’ (Thomson 
 1971 , p. 113). 
 This revolution in style was extremely important because ‘the topic of 
abortion’ was one that ‘had been tainted by people’s (generally unvoiced) 
moralistic assumptions about sex and sexuality, and by their dismissive 
characterization of it as a “woman’s problem”’ (Davis  2001 , pp. 88–89). 
By putting the example in the second person, Thomson made the male 
reader adopt the perspective of a pregnant woman:
 prior to the publication of ADA, women made only infrequent appearances 
in philosophers’ examples. … Thomson’s creation of an example that both 
sought to model the intense physicality and overwhelmingness of preg-
nancy… and involved men as players – I am assuming that most professional 
philosophers in the early 1970s were male, and that Thomson knew that was 
the case – was, I think, brilliant (Davis  2001 , p. 96). 
 Her article was thus revolutionary in being a  feminist work. Indeed, the 
Good Samaritan Argument, in addition to being known as the ‘Argument 
from Bodily Autonomy’ (Feinberg  1980 , p. 209), is also referred to as 
the ‘Feminist Argument’ (Singer  2011 [1979], p. 132). When Thomson 
returned to the subject of abortion in 1995, she explicitly cast the abor-
tion debate in terms of its importance to women’s equality:
 So this is an issue of great importance to women. Denial of the abortion 
right severely constrains their liberty, and among the consequences of that 
constraint are impediments to their achievement of equality (Thomson 
 1995 , p. 20). 
 Even if those who formed the Society for Philosophy and Public Affairs in 
1969 did not intend it, ‘when philosophy, and especially ethics, became 
“practical” in the late 60s’ it also became feminist. 
2   THOMSON’S DEFENCE OF ABORTION 
 Thomson’s defence of abortion is as follows. Everyone possesses the right 
to his or her own body. This is the right to bodily autonomy: ‘My own 
view is that if a human being has any just, prior claim to anything at all, 
he has a just, prior claim to his own body’ (Thomson  1971 , p. 54). What 
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this right amounts to is the right to refuse to allow another person to use 
my body. No one has the right to use my body without my permission. 
 In the case of pregnancy as a result of rape, the fetus has no right to 
use the woman’s body, because the woman has not given the fetus permis-
sion to use the woman’s body. As she says: ‘I suppose we may take it as a 
datum that in a case of pregnancy due to rape the mother has not given 
the unborn person a right to the use of her body for food and shelter’ 
(Thomson  1971 , p. 57). Since the fetus has no right to use the woman’s 
body, the woman may refuse to allow the fetus to use her body. If she 
refuses to allow the fetus to use her body, she is not violating any right of 
the fetus. However, the  only way for a woman to refuse to allow a (non- 
viable) fetus to use her body is for her to have an abortion. This is simply 
a fact about human biology. Hence, in the case of a pregnancy as a result 
of rape, at least when the fetus is not viable, abortion violates no right of 
the fetus (Mahon  2014 , p. 1431). In such a case at least, abortion is not 
a violation of the right to life of the fetus, because the right to life is the 
right not to be killed unjustly, and such a killing is not an unjust killing. 
Thus, we are led to
 the conclusion that unborn persons whose existence is due to rape have no 
right to the use of their mothers’ bodies, and thus that aborting them is not 
depriving them of anything they have a right to and hence is not unjust kill-
ing (Thomson  1971 , p. 58). 
 Of course, the woman may choose to allow the fetus to use her body. She 
may choose not to have an abortion. But since the fetus has no right to 
use her body, it follows that, if she does allow the fetus to use her body, 
and does not have an abortion, this is a  supererogatory act on her part. If 
she allows the fetus to use her body, then she is being a ‘Good Samaritan’ 
to the fetus. 
 Thomson provides an example to support her argument. Imagine 
that you are kidnapped by a group of musical enthusiasts and wake up 
to fi nd yourself in bed, hooked up to a violinist who is unconscious. The 
violinist has also been kidnapped by the same group of musical enthusi-
asts. The violinist has failing kidneys and requires the use of your kidneys 
for nine months in order to repair his kidneys. At the end of the nine 
months, he will be woken up from his unconscious state, healthy again, 
and you will be free to return to whatever you were doing before you 
were kidnapped. If you remain hooked up to the violinist, he will live. 
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But if you disconnect yourself from the violinist, he will die. According 
to Thomson:
 If anything in the world is true, it is that you do not commit murder, you do 
not do what is impermissible, if you reach around to your back and unplug 
yourself from that violinist to save your life (Thomson  1971 , p. 52). 
 Since the unconscious violinist has no right to use your body, you do not 
violate any right of his by unhooking yourself from him and killing him. 
You do not violate his right to life, since his right to life does not extend 
to a right to use your body. 
3   MAHON’S ARGUMENT AGAINST ABORTION 
 Mahon’s argument against abortion is formulated provisionally as follows:
 Killing an innocent and defenceless human being is wrong. 
 Killing a fetus is killing an innocent and defenceless human being. 
 Therefore, killing a fetus is wrong. 
 Therefore, abortion is wrong (Mahon  1984 , p. 92). 
 In defence of the second premise, Mahon argues, ‘the word “human” 
signifi es, or denotes, a being at  some stage of its development’. The life of 
this being, it is said, ‘does not begin at birth but, on average, 38 weeks 
prior to its birth’ (Mahon  1984 , p. 93). The ‘unborn or premature human 
being… is, as a rule, called the “foetus”’. Mahon distinguishes between 
being a ‘human being’ and being a ‘person’. A ‘person’, he claims, is a
 biologically mature specimen of its kind, exhibiting in unequivocal mea-
sure those powers and proclivities, such as ratiocinative, moral, political, and 
productive powers and proclivities, that typify entities of that mature kind 
(Mahon  1984 , p. 93). 
 By contrast, ‘a human life, as distinct from the life of a person, begins at 
conception (or fertilization) and ends at death’ (Mahon  1984 , p. 95). To 
say that a fetus is a human being is simply to say that a fetus is member of 
the species  Homo sapiens . Even if it were argued against Mahon that there 
are, or can be, persons who are not human beings (chimpanzees, dolphins, 
Martians, angels, God, et cetera), Mahon would still be correct in saying 
that (human) fetuses are human beings. Further, even if it were argued 
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against Mahon that fetuses are persons, Mahon would still be correct in 
saying that they are human beings. 
 In defence of the second premise, Mahon also argues that the fetus 
‘is incapable of harbouring malevolent intentions’ and that the fetus ‘is 
defenceless or completely vulnerable to attack’ (Mahon  1984 , p.  94). 
These twin claims are not controversial. Mahon does consider an objec-
tion to the second premise made by G.A. Cohen. 5 The objection is that 
‘the concept of a human being is too wide’ in this second premise, since, 
according to it, ‘a  zygote , i.e., what exists from conception to implantation 
about a week later, would qualify as a human being’, and it is ‘absurd’ to 
claim that to kill a zygote is to ‘kill an innocent and defenceless human 
being’ (Mahon  1984 , pp.  94–95). While admitting that the objection 
‘appears to be a very strong one’, Mahon in the end rejects the charge 
that it is absurd to claim that to kill a zygote is to kill an innocent and 
defenceless human being. Its apparent absurdity stems from ‘the tendency 
to date membership of the human race from the point of birth’ and from 
‘the tendency to automatically think of human beings in terms of persons’ 
(Mahon  1984 , pp. 95–96). Both tendencies are misleading, since it is false 
that something is not a human being until it is born, and it is false that all 
human beings are persons. 
 In defence of the fi rst premise, Mahon considers the objection that ‘it 
forbids killing when there is, demonstrably, a right to kill. To be more 
precise, we do, conceivably, sometimes have the right to take innocent 
and defenceless human life’ (Mahon  1984 , p. 94). The strongest version 
of this objection, Mahon considers, is to be found in Thomson’s defence 
of abortion. 
 Mahon summarizes Thomson’s defence of abortion as follows: ‘cer-
tain persons do not have the right to life’, and ‘the fetus is such a person’ 
(Mahon  1984 , p. 108). That is, the fetus lacks a right to life. Note that 
Thomson would reject this characterization of her argument. She holds 
that the fetus does have a right to life (or rather, she grants this for the sake 
of the argument; her own position is that a fetus in the early stages of preg-
nancy lacks a right to life). 6 This is the right not to be killed unjustly (i.e., 
the right not to be murdered). As she says: ‘the right to life consists not in 
the right not to be killed, but rather in the right not to be killed unjustly’ 
(Thomson  1971 , p.  57). She simply rejects the argument that because 
a fetus, like everyone else who is innocent, has a right not to be killed 
unjustly, it follows that a fetus has a right not to be killed. Her argument is 
that, even if a fetus has a right to life, it is still morally permissible to kill a 
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(non-viable) fetus, if this is the only way to stop the fetus from using your 
body. Human biology being the way it is, however, this  is the only way. 
 The fi rst of Mahon’s criticisms of Thomson’s argument that will be 
considered here is the criticism that the example involving the unconscious 
violinist fails to be analogous to pregnancy as a result of rape, because ‘The 
woman is the  mother of the fetus; no such relation exists, or at least no 
such relation has been postulated, between the kidney-captive and the 
violinist’ (Mahon  1984 , p. 110, emphasis in original). 7 Importantly, other 
philosophers have rejected the use of the term ‘mother’ to refer to the 
woman who is pregnant as a result of rape, although Thomson herself 
uses the term in her article. ‘Mother’, they argue, implies or connotes 
something more than the biological fact of being pregnant, in the form 
of a special relationship towards the fetus or a special responsibility for the 
fetus. In the case of unwanted pregnancy in general, and in the case of 
pregnancy as a result of rape in particular, however, there is nothing more 
than the biological fact of being pregnant. They would object to Mahon’s 
characterization of the woman who is pregnant as a result of rape as a 
‘mother’. 8 
 Mahon may be said to have considered Thomson to have responded 
in this vein to his disanalogy criticism. He says that ‘She fi rst points out 
that it is commonly believed that to say X is the mother of Y is to say 
that X has a  special responsibility for Y’ (Mahon  1984 , p. 112), and he 
then quotes Thomson as saying: ‘Surely we do not have any such “spe-
cial responsibility” for a person unless we have assumed it, explicitly or 
implicitly’ (Thomson, quoted in Mahon  1984 , p. 113). The point is that 
‘mother’ either does not imply any responsibility for caring for the fetus, 
or it implies having a responsibility for caring for a child that has been 
assumed, either explicitly or implicitly. Hence, someone who is pregnant 
as a result of rape is either a ‘mother’ who has not (or not yet) assumed 
responsibility for caring for a child or is not (or not yet) a ‘mother’. As 
he says, ‘Thomson attaches little fundamental importance to the heredi-
tary relation between the mother and her unborn offspring’, a hereditary 
relation which he characterizes as based on the fact that ‘the make-up of 
the foetus is due, in part, to genes transmitted from the woman whose 
womb it occupies’ (Mahon  1984 , p. 113). What he says about the lack 
of importance of such a hereditary relationship for Thomson is quite cor-
rect, since such a relation exists in the case of a pregnancy that is the result 
of rape, and Thomson states explicitly that such a relationship does not 
imply any responsibility for caring for the fetus. The responsibility must be 
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assumed. As Mahon summarizes Thomson’s position, ‘What matters basi-
cally is whether she wanted the child. If she did, then it has rights against 
her, and she has obligations toward it. If she didn’t, then it has no rights 
against her’ (Mahon  1984 , p. 113). 
 This is basically right, although the fi nal sentence here is somewhat 
misleading, since it is not true that the fetus has no rights against the preg-
nant woman. Thomson does hold that a fetus has rights against a pregnant 
woman. Most importantly, the fetus has the right not to be killed unjustly. 
It is just that a fetus does not have the right against the pregnant woman 
to use her body, and this right is the relevant right here. Thomson is quite 
clear that, if it were possible for the fetus to survive without using the 
pregnant woman’s body (to be removed from her body), then it would 
be a violation of the fetus’s rights—indeed, it would be murder—for the 
pregnant woman to kill the fetus: ‘I agree that the desire for the child’s 
death is not one which anybody may gratify, should it turn out to be pos-
sible to detach the child alive’ (Thomson  1971 , p. 66). As N. Ann Davis 
has correctly stated, the right that Thomson is defending in her article 
is the right to not be  pregnant : ‘her view of abortion [is] as essentially a 
form of pregnancy termination that involves fetal detachment, rather than 
as the deliberate termination of the life of the fetus’ (Davis  2001 , p. 93). 
 Mahon’s belief that Thompson has already responded to his disanalogy 
criticism leads him to make his main criticism. Characterizing her argu-
ment as the argument that ‘one cannot be responsible for someone unless 
one has promised to, or assumed responsibility for that person at some 
stage’, Mahon argues that this is false:
 I can be responsible for the victims of a car crash, for instance (i.e., have 
moral duties towards them), even if I have never seen the victims before in 
my life, without ever having given an undertaking to help them, and with-
out my having chosen to be the person on whom they now depend for help. 
How far this obligation goes is, of course, another thing. I certainly do not 
think it goes so far as to give one’s life. If I am right about this, then there 
is at least one circumstance in which an abortion is morally justifi ed, namely, 
where a woman has been raped, where she is pregnant as a result of being 
raped, and where her life is in imminent danger as a result of that pregnancy. 
In such a case, she is not morally obliged to sacrifi ce her life (Mahon  1984 , 
pp. 113–114). 
 In order for this criticism to apply to Thomson’s argument, it must be the 
case that someone who is the victim of a car crash has a right to be helped 
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by a mere bystander, because the bystander is ‘morally obliged’ to help 
the victim. Similarly, a fetus has a right to use the pregnant woman’s body, 
even in the case of pregnancy as a result of rape (at least when this does 
not involve the loss of the pregnant woman’s life), because the pregnant 
woman is ‘morally obliged’ to bring the pregnancy to term. 
 It is important to see why Thomson would reject this criticism. 
According to Thomson, it is false that the car crash victim has a right to be 
helped by the bystander. The most that can be said is that the bystander 
ought to help the car crash victim. However, it does not follow from this 
that the car crash victim has a right to the bystander’s help. From the fact 
that A  ought to help B, it does not follow that B has a  right to be helped 
by A. As she says:
 [S]uppose pregnancy lasted only an hour, and constituted no threat to life 
or health. And suppose that a woman becomes pregnant as a result of rape. 
Admittedly she did not voluntarily do anything to bring about the existence 
of the child. Admittedly she did nothing at all which would give the unborn 
person a right to the use of her body. All the same it might well be said … 
that she  ought to allow it to remain for that hour … Now some people are 
inclined to use the term ‘right’ in such a way that it follows from the fact 
that you ought to allow a person to use your body for the hour he needs, 
that he has a right to use your body for the hour he needs, even though he 
has not been given that right by any person or act. They may even say that it 
follows also that if you refuse, you act unjustly toward him. This use of the 
term is perhaps so common that it cannot be called wrong; nevertheless it 
seems to me to be an unfortunate loosening of what we would do better to 
keep a tight rein on (Thomson  1971 , p. 60). 
 It must be said that it remains ambiguous in Thomson’s article as to what 
‘A has a moral obligation to B to ∅’ means. It may mean the stronger ‘B 
has a right to ∅ from A’. If it does, then ‘A has a moral obligation to B 
to ∅’ is not equivalent to, and cannot be derived from, ‘A ought to ∅ (to 
B)’. Or, it may mean the weaker ‘A ought to ∅ (to B)’. If it does, then 
‘B has a right to ∅ from A’ is not equivalent to, and cannot be derived 
from, ‘A has a moral obligation to B to ∅’. Because of this ambiguity in 
her article, it remains uncertain as to whether Thomson would argue that 
a bystander has no moral obligation to help a car crash victim, or whether 
she would argue that a bystander has a moral obligation to help a car 
crash victim, but that the car crash victim has no right to be helped by the 
bystander. 
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 Nevertheless, Thomson does hold that the stronger ‘B has a right to ∅ 
from A’ is not equivalent to, and may not be derived from, the weaker ‘A 
ought to ∅ (to B)’. As she says about moral requirements—which would 
appear to be equivalent to moral obligations—in discussing a variation on 
the violinist example in which the violinist only needs to use your kidneys 
for 1 hour in order to live:
 If anyone does wish to deduce “he has a right” from “you ought”, then all 
the same he must surely grant that there are cases in which it is not mor-
ally required of you that you allow that violinist to use your kidneys, and in 
which he does not have a right to them, and in which you do not do him an 
injustice if you refuse ( 1971 , p. 61). 
 Thomson would therefore reject Mahon’s claim that a car crash victim 
has a right to be helped by a bystander, and that it would be unjust of the 
bystander not to help the victim. 
 Mahon could reply by adapting an argument from Peter Singer ( 1972 ). 
Imagine that you come across a child drowning in a shallow pond. Even if 
you have not assumed any responsibility whatsoever to take care of drown-
ing persons, such as becoming a life guard, and even if the child is a com-
plete stranger, it still seems that the child has a right to be rescued by you, 
when all it would take to save the child is to wade into the shallow pond 
and pull the child out of the water. In the case of pregnancy as a result of 
rape, it could be argued, the fetus is in a similar position to the child in the 
shallow pond. Without the use of the pregnant woman’s body, the fetus 
will die. Even if the pregnant woman has not given the fetus permission 
to use her body, it still seems that the fetus has a right to use her body, 
when all it would take is 9 months of her time (or at least until the fetus is 
viable). Indeed, Thomson says that her argument holds even if ‘pregnancy 
lasted only an hour, and constituted no threat to life or health’. Surely, the 
fetus has a right to use her body for 1 hour. 
 It is important to understand that Thomson would reject this argu-
ment. In her article, she provides the following counterargument, using a 
pair of examples:
 [T]o deprive someone of what he has a right to is to treat him unjustly. 
Suppose a boy and his small brother are jointly given a box of chocolates 
for Christmas. If the older boy takes the box and refuses to give his brother 
any of the chocolates, he is unjust to him, for the brother has a right to half 
of them. … 
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 Suppose that box of chocolates I mentioned earlier had not been given 
to both boys jointly, but was given only to the older boy. There he sits, stol-
idly eating his way through the box, his small brother watching enviously. 
Here we are likely to say, “You ought not to be so mean. You ought to give 
your brother some of those chocolates.” My own view is that it just does 
not follow from the truth of this that the brother has any right to any of the 
chocolates. If the boy refuses to give his brother any, he is greedy, stingy, 
callous – but not unjust. … 
 So my own view is that even though you ought to let the violinist use 
your kidneys for the one hour he needs, we should not conclude that he has 
a right to do so – we should say that if you refuse, you are, like the boy who 
owns all the chocolates and will give none away, self-centered and callous, 
indecent in fact, but not unjust. And similarly, that even supposing a case 
in which a woman pregnant due to rape ought to allow the unborn person 
to use her body for the hour he needs, we should not conclude that he has 
a right to do so; we should conclude that she is self-centered, callous, inde-
cent, but not unjust, if she refuses ( 1971 , pp. 56, 60–61). 
 According to Thomson, if you do not allow the violinist to use your 
kidneys for just 1 hour, then you are callous, self-centred, et cetera, but 
you are not unjust. This is because he has no right to use your kidneys. 
Similarly, if the woman who is pregnant as a result of rape does not allow 
the fetus to use her body for just 1 hour, she is callous, self-centred, et 
cetera. But she is not unjust. This is because the fetus has no right to use 
the pregnant woman’s body. Likewise, if you do not help the child drown-
ing in the shallow pond, by wading in and saving him, you are callous, 
self-centred, et cetera. But you are not unjust. This is because the child has 
no right to be rescued by you. As it has been said:
 If I choose to refrain from saving the toddler drowning in the mud puddle, 
I would not be violating the moral right of the toddler, but I would still be 
acting as a “moral monster” (Liberto  2012 , p. 397). 
 Finally, if the woman who is pregnant as a result of rape does not allow the 
fetus to use her body for 9 months, then she is not callous or self- centred, 
et cetera. She is merely not being a Good Samaritan. 
 It is now possible to return to the fi rst premise of Mahon’s argument. It 
does seem that there is a right to kill an innocent and defenceless human 
being. When an innocent and defenceless human being is using your body 
without your permission, and the only way to refuse to allow this innocent 
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and defenceless human being to use your body is to kill this innocent and 
defenceless human being, then you have a right to kill this innocent and 
defenceless human being. This is because the innocent and defenceless 
human being lacks a right to use your body, and you have a right to your 
own body. Mahon’s argument against abortion must be rejected. 
4   THOMSON AND INDECENCY 
 Although I have defended Thomson’s argument above, there are at 
least two problems with it. The fi rst is a problem with her terminology. 
This requires some explaining. Thomson concludes the article with the 
following:
 First, while I do argue that abortion is not impermissible, I do not argue 
that it is always permissible. There may well be cases in which carrying the 
child to term requires only Minimally Decent Samaritanism of the mother, 
and this is a standard that we must not fall below. I am inclined to think it a 
merit of my account precisely that it does  not give a general yes or a general 
no. It allows for and supports our general sense that, for example, a sick and 
desperately frightened fourteen-year-old schoolgirl, pregnant due to rape, 
may  of course choose abortion, and that any law which rules this out is an 
insane law. And it also allows for and supports our sense that in other cases 
resort to abortion is even positively indecent. It would be indecent in the 
woman to request an abortion, and indecent in a doctor to perform it, if she 
is in her seventh month, and wants the abortion to avoid the nuisance of 
postponing a trip abroad (Thomson  1971 , pp. 65–66). 
 Here, Thomson distinguishes between an abortion where the woman is 
not ‘indecent’ (the 14-year-old pregnant rape victim), and an abortion 
where the woman is ‘indecent’ (the 7-month pregnant woman who wishes 
to go on holiday). In saying that the woman in the second example is 
‘indecent’, Thomson would appear to be saying that she is callous, self- 
centred, et cetera, although her action is not unjust. Her behaviour falls 
below the standard of being a ‘Minimally Decent Samaritan’, which is ‘a 
standard that we must not’—that is, ought not—‘fall below’. Nevertheless, 
this woman does not violate a right of the fetus. 
 A term that captures this type of behavior is  suberogatory . 9 As Julia 
Driver explains: ‘Suberogatory acts are acts that we ought not to do, 
but which are not forbidden … The suberogatory is “mere badness”’ 
(Driver  1992 , p. 291). Thomson, it would seem, holds that ‘a frivolous 
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abortion… is bad’ and that ‘bad abortions’ are ‘suberogatory’ (Driver 
 1992 , p. 292). 
 If a pregnant woman who has an abortion in the seventh month of 
pregnancy to go on holiday is (merely) ‘indecent’, however, and the abor-
tion is (merely) suberogatory, then this must be because, even in the sev-
enth month of her pregnancy, the fetus has no right to use the pregnant 
woman’s body. This means, fi rst, that the fetus in this example must not be 
viable, because Thomson insists that ‘should it turn out to be possible to 
detach the child alive’ an abortion at 7 months would be a violation of the 
fetus’s right not to be killed unjustly. Second, since there is no indication 
that the pregnancy was the result of rape, it means that whether or not 
the pregnancy is the result of rape is ultimately irrelevant to the question 
of whether or not the fetus has a right to use the woman’s body. The only 
thing that is relevant is whether or not the woman wishes to allow the 
fetus to use her body. 
 If this is correct, then Thomson  does give ‘a general yes’ to the ques-
tion of the permissibility of (voluntary) abortion, at least when the fetus 
is not viable: (voluntary) abortion is  always permissible. 10 Abortion  never 
violates the right to life of a fetus. Thomson does indeed embrace the 
‘“extreme” liberal position’ that has been attributed to her by Driver: 
‘a liberal should view all (early) abortions as permissible even when the 
mother is quite healthy and could take care of the baby without diffi culty’ 
(Driver  1992 , p. 289). 11 
 The problem with this conclusion is that Thomson claims that she does 
 not ‘give a general yes or a general no’ to the question of the permissibility 
of abortion, and that she does  not ‘argue that it is always permissible’ to 
have an abortion when the fetus is not viable. 
 She could avoid the contradiction by arguing that her use of ‘permissi-
ble’ and ‘impermissible’ is equivalent to her use of ‘decent’ and ‘indecent’. 
She could say that when she talks about ‘a standard that we must not fall 
below’ in our behaviour towards other people—the standard of being a 
Minimally Decent Samaritan, that is, the standard of being decent—she 
is talking about the standard of what is ‘permissible’ behaviour towards 
other people. The woman who has an abortion in the seventh month of 
her pregnancy would therefore be acting  impermissibly . Meanwhile, the 
14-year-old rape victim who has an abortion would be acting  permissibly . 
 If Thomson defended herself in this way, however, she would have to 
admit that her use of ‘permissible’ and ‘impermissible’ is different from 
that of most moral philosophers and common usage. 12 Normally, when 
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you say that someone is acting callously, or self-centredly, et cetera, but is 
not violating anyone’s rights, you are saying that she is  not acting imper-
missibly. Indeed, suberogatory actions are precisely actions ‘that are per-
missible, though bad’ (Driver  1992 , p. 291). If Thomson identifi ed acting 
impermissibly with acting indecently but not violating anyone’s rights, 
then she would be saying that someone can be acting both impermis-
sibly and justly, which is a highly unusual claim. It would also mean that 
indecent abortions are not suberogatory actions after all, since suberoga-
tory actions are those actions that ‘are deserving of negative evaluation, 
without being actually wrong, where wrong just means “impermissible”’ 
(Driver  1992 , p. 286, n. 2). 13 
 This fi rst terminological problem with her argument can be remedied 
in one of two ways, in order to avoid a contradiction. Thomson can state 
explicitly that by ‘impermissible’ she merely means acting in a way that is 
‘indecent’ (callously, self-centredly, et cetera), and that by ‘permissible’ 
she merely means acting in way that is ‘decent’ (not acting callously, self- 
centredly, et cetera). Or she can alter the claims in her conclusion. She 
can say that ‘I do … argue that it is always permissible [although not 
always decent, to have an abortion when the fetus is not viable]’, and ‘I 
am inclined to think it a merit of my account precisely that it does  not give 
a general yes or a general no [as to whether or not an abortion is decent, 
although it does give a general yes or a general no as to whether or not an 
abortion is permissible, namely, a general yes]’. 
 The second problem with her argument is a more serious problem, 
because it is a problem with the argument itself.  Why is having an abortion 
(of a non-viable fetus) in the seventh month of pregnancy, in order to go 
on a holiday, (merely) ‘indecent’? It seems clear that the pregnancy was 
desired, and that the woman originally expected to bring the pregnancy 
to term. More importantly, since the woman is in her seventh month of 
pregnancy, it might be thought that the fetus has acquired the right to use 
the woman’s body by now. Has the fetus not acquired such a right? If so, 
what is her argument? 
 At one point in the article Thomson says: ‘Suppose a woman volun-
tarily indulges in intercourse, knowing of the chance that it will issue in 
pregnancy, and then she does become pregnant’ (Thomson  1971 , p. 57). 
About this hypothetical situation, she comments:
 It seems to me that the argument we are looking at can establish at most 
that there are  some cases in which the unborn person has a right to the use of 
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its mother’s body, and therefore  some cases in which abortion is unjust kill-
ing. There is room for much discussion and argument as to precisely which, 
if any (Thomson  1971 , p. 59). 
 The ‘if any’ here is very telling. Thomson provides no example of a case 
in which a non-viable fetus has acquired a right to use the woman’s body. 
She provides no example of an abortion that is an unjust killing. 
 The closest that Thomson comes to providing an example of an unjust 
killing is the following:
 If a set of parents do not try to prevent pregnancy, do not obtain an abor-
tion, and then at the time of birth of the child do not put it out for adoption, 
but rather take it home with them, then they have assumed responsibility for 
it, they have given it rights, and they cannot  now withdraw support for it at 
the cost of its life because they now fi nd it diffi cult to go on providing for it 
(Thomson  1971 , p. 65). 
 Importantly, this is not a case of an abortion. It is a case of parents with-
drawing ‘food and shelter’ from the child they have taken home with 
them, resulting in the child’s death (since no one else is apparently avail-
able to take care of the child). The example is not analogous to pregnancy, 
because having a claim to food and shelter from other people is different 
from having a claim to use another person’s  body for food and shelter. 
 I take Thomson to hold that there is  no case in which a (non-viable) 
fetus acquires a right to use the pregnant woman’s body, and that  no 
 abortion (of a non-viable fetus) is unjust. The problem is that she has 
provided no argument for this conclusion. 
 This second problem, too, can be remedied. 14 In addition to its being 
true that no one has the right to use my body without my permission; 
it is also true that I may revoke this permission at any time. I am always 
free to refuse to allow another person to use my body, and I am always 
free to refuse to allow another person to  continue to use my body, even 
if I have allowed the person to use my body up until now. My freedom 
to decide if someone may or may not use my body is  inalienable . Since I 
may refuse to allow another person to use my body, even if this results in 
the person’s death, I may refuse to allow another person to continue to 
use my body, even if this results in the person’s death, despite the fact that 
I have allowed the person to use my body up until now. This argument 
is implied by her claim that ‘if a human being has any just, prior claim to 
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anything at all, he has a just, prior claim to his own body’, and, perhaps, by 
comments such as the following: ‘Women have said again and again, “This 
is  my body!” and they have reason to feel angry, reason to feel that it has 
been like shouting into the wind’ (Thomson  1971 , p. 53). 15 
 NOTES 
1.  The two other defences of abortion he criticizes are Kamm ( 1976 ) and 
Dooley-Clarke ( 1981 ). On a different point, I should apologize in advance 
for any confusion that results in my writing about someone who shares my 
name—namely, my father. 
2.  My defence of Thomson is very much in the spirit of Boonin ( 2002 ). 
3.  An equally historically important article on abortion is that by Philippa Foot 
( 1967 ). It should not be lost on us that Philippa Foot was another promi-
nent woman philosopher at a time when there were much fewer women in 
philosophy. Foot and Thomson, between them, may be said to have created 
the ‘Trolley Problem’, perhaps the most famous ‘problem’ of modern moral 
philosophy. 
4.  To give just one example, the recent 2014 US Supreme Court decision, 
 Burwell v. Holly Lobby , essentially concerns the question of whether for-profi t 
corporations are exempt from the mandate of the Affordable Care Act to pay 
for Plan B,  ella , et cetera, for their employees, because those running the 
corporations consider these to be abortifacients rather than contraceptives. 
For the background to this debate, see Hrobak and Wilson ( 2014 ). 
5.  Sadly, G.A. (Jerry) Cohen, a friend of my father’s from my father’s sabbati-
cal year at University College London in 1979–1980, died in 2009 and 
could not be a contributor to this volume. 
6.  As Thomson says, ‘we have only been pretending throughout that the fetus 
is a human being from the moment of conception. A very early abortion is 
surely not the killing of a person’ (Thomson  1971 , p. 66). 
7.  Space constraints prohibit discussion of every one of Mahon’s objections to 
Thomson’s argument. I have selected the two most important criticisms. 
8.  For an argument against using the term ‘mother’ to refer to a woman who 
is an ‘abortion candidate’, see Nancy Davis ( 1984 ). 
9.  An older term for this kind of action was ‘offence’. See Chisholm ( 1963 ). 
See also Mellema ( 1987 ) and Mahon ( 2006 ). 
10.  The assumption throughout this essay is that the abortion under discussion 
is a voluntary abortion, and not one that is coerced or performed without 
the consent of the pregnant woman. 
11.  Footnote 9 on the same page attributes this position to Thomson. Note that 
Driver says about this position that ‘no consideration is given to the fetus in 
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determining the permissibility of the abortion’ ( 1992 , p. 289, n. 9). I would 
prefer to say that moral consideration is given to the fetus—Thomson 
assumes for the sake of the argument that a fetus is a person—but that the 
fetus, despite its moral status, is judged to fail to have a right to use the 
pregnant woman’s body, which is the only right that would make the abor-
tion impermissible. 
12.  My thanks to Melina Bell for discussion of the normal moral philosophical 
usage of these terms. 
13.  For this reason, Liberto ( 2012 , p.  399) is incorrect when she says that 
Thomson ‘suggests that it is probably morally impermissible for the older 
brother to refuse to share the chocolates’ with the younger brother. The 
older brother is being callous, self-centred, et cetera, but he is not doing 
anything impermissible. 
14.  There remains a third problem.  Why is having an abortion (of a non-viable 
fetus) in the seventh month of pregnancy, in order to go on a holiday, ‘inde-
cent’ at all? What is the argument for this claim? Lack of space prohibits 
discussion of this third problem. 
15.  The argument of the penultimate section of this essay was fi rst presented 
in a talk at ‘Roe at 40—The Controversy Continues’, a symposium at 
Washington and Lee University School of Law, on 8 November 2013. For 
discussions about the argument contained in that talk (a version of which 
was later published [Mahon  2014 ]), I would like to thank Melina Bell. For 
an exchange about what Thomson says in her article about permissibility, 
impermissibility, and indecency, I would also like to thank Jessica Gordon-
Roth. For clarifi cation of Thomson’s argument, I would like to thank 
David Boonin. For a discussion about the suberogatory and Thomson’s 
argument, I would like to thank Julia Driver. Over the years, I have bene-
fi tted from discussing Thomson’s article with many different undergradu-
ates and law students at Washington and Lee University, and I would like 
to take this opportunity to thank them for these discussions. I fi rst dis-
cussed the topic of abortion with my parents, Joseph Mahon and Evelyn 
Mahon, as a teenager in the context of the passing of the Eighth 
Amendment to the Constitution of Ireland in 1983, which attempted to 
copperfasten a ban on abortion in Ireland. Years later, I helped proofread 
my mother’s report to the Irish government,  Women and Crisis Pregnancy 
(Mahon et al.  1998 ). I am happy that the occasion of my father’s retire-
ment from teaching philosophy has afforded me the opportunity to write 
on this topic, even if I disagree with the position he defended in his early 
writings (he has since moved on). Finally, I would like to thank the 
University of International Business and Economics in Beijing, China, for 
affording me the opportunity to complete work on this essay in the 
s ummer of 2015. 
76 J.E. MAHON
 REFERENCES 
 Boonin, D. (2002).  A defense of abortion . Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
 Brody, B. (1972). Thomson on abortion.  Philosophy & Public Affairs, 2 (3), 
335–340. 
 Chisholm, R. M. (1963). Supererogation and offence: A conceptual scheme for 
ethics.  Ratio, 5 , 1–14. 
 Davis, N. (1984). Abortion and self-defense.  Philosophy & Public Affairs, 13 (3), 
175–207. 
 Davis, N. A. (2001). Fiddling second: Refl ections on “A Defense of Abortion”. In 
A. Byrne, R. C. Stalnaker, & R. Wedgwood (Eds.),  Fact and value: Essays on 
ethics and metaphysics for Judith Jarvis Thomson (pp. 81–96). Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press. 
 Dooley-Clarke, D. (1981, September 11). Just exceptions to moral principles.  The 
Irish Times . 
 Driver, J. (1992). The suberogatory.  Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 70 (3), 
286–295. 
 Dworkin, R. (Ed.). (1977).  The philosophy of law . Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 Feinberg, J. (1980). Abortion. In T.  Regan (Ed.),  Matters of life and death . 
Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press. 
 Finnis, J. (1973). The rights and wrongs of abortion: A reply to Judith Thomson. 
 Philosophy & Public Affairs, 2 (2), 117–145. 
 Foot, P. (1967). The problem of abortion and the doctrine of double effect. 
 Oxford Review, 5 , 5–15. 
 Hrobak, R. M., & Wilson, R. F. (2014). Emergency contraceptives or abortion- 
inducing drugs? Empowering women to make informed decisions.  Washington 
and Lee Law Review, 71 (2), 1385–1428. 
 Kamm, F. M. (1976). Review of Marvin Kohl, The morality of killing: Sanctity of 
life, abortion, and euthanasia.  Philosophical Review, 85 , 124–126. 
 Liberto, H. R. (2012). Denying the suberogatory.  Philosophia, 40 (2), 395–402. 
 Mahon, E., Conlon, C., & Dillon, L. (1998).  Women and crisis pregnancy: A 
report presented to the Department of Health and Children . Dublin: The 
Stationary Offi ce. 
 Mahon, J. (1975). Philosophy and public matters.  Understanding , pp. 5, 5–11. 
 Mahon, J. (1979, November 10). The ethics of abortion.  Irish Medical Times . 
 Mahon, J. (1984).  An introduction to practical ethics . Dublin: Turoe Press. 
 Mahon, J. E. (2006). The good, the bad, and the obligatory.  Journal of Value 
Inquiry, 40 (1), 59–71. 
 Mahon, J. E. (2014). Innocent burdens.  Washington and Lee Law Review, 71 (2), 
1429–1472. 
 Mellema, G. (1987). Quasi-supererogation.  Philosophical Studies, 52 (1), 
141–150. 
ABORTION AND THE RIGHT TO NOT BE PREGNANT 77
 Parent, W. (1986). ‘Preface’ to J.J. Thomson,  Rights, restitution, and risk: Essays 
in moral theory (pp. vii–x). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
 Rachels, J. (Ed.). (1975).  Moral problems . New York: Harper & Row. 
 Rawls, J. (1971).  A theory of justice . Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
 Singer, P. (1972). Famine, affl uence, and morality.  Philosophy & Public Affairs, 
1 (3), 229–243. 
 Singer, P. (2011 [1979]). Practical ethics (3rd ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 Thomson, J. J. (1971). A defense of abortion.  Philosophy & Public Affairs, 1 (1), 
47–66. 
 Thomson, J.  J. (1973). Rights and deaths.  Philosophy & Public Affairs, 2 (2), 
146–159. 
 Thomson, J. J. (1995). Abortion.  Boston Review, 20 (3), 11–15. 
 Thomson, J. J. (2013). How it was. In S. M. Cahn (Ed.),  Portraits of American 
philosophy (pp. 47–61). Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefi eld. 
 Tooley, M. (1972). Abortion and infanticide.  Philosophy & Public Affairs, 2 (1), 
37–65. 
 Wertheimer, R. (1971). Understanding the abortion argument.  Philosophy & 
Public Affairs, 1 (1), 67–95. 
